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Essay 
Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: 
Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction 
Kevin C. McMunigaP 
Ambiguity and incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts test for 
the more than five decades during which it has served as a cornerstone of 
the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction doctrine. At its inception in 1945, 
Justice Black called the minimum contacts test "vague," "uncertain," and 
"confusing." 1 Supreme Court cases in the intervening years have amplified 
that ambiguity. More than forty years after Justice Black's comments, 
federal appellate judges echo his criticism, complaining that the test is 
composed of "gestalt factors" 2 and describing its application as "more an 
art than a science." 3 In short, the minimum contacts test's criteria are 
confused, its purposes perplexing, and its results often unpredictable.4 
To remedy this situation, some scholars have proposed significant 
changes in the test, such as abandonment of many of the factors currently 
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I am grateful to Stephen Bundy, 
William Fletcher, Sanford Kadish, Mary Kay Kane, Robert Lawry, William Marshall, Karen 
Moore, Mollie Murphy, Richard Myers, and Robert Strassfeld for comments on earlier drafts. I 
also thank Matthew Kades and Jennifer Lawry for research assistance and Alice Hunt for 
invaluable secretarial support. 
1. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 323 (1945) (opinion of Black, J.). 
2. Ticketrnaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201,209 (1st Cir. 1994). 
3. Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 468 n.7 (1st Cir. 1990). 
4. For a critical assessment of the Supreme Court's handling of the minimum contacts 
doctrine, see Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1, 7 (1989), 
which states that "since International Shoe the Supreme Court has had a difficult time defining 
when an assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with 'fair play and substantial justice."' Not all 
commentators, however, would agree that the minimum contacts doctrine is as ambiguous and 
incoherent as I claim. For an assessment that finds order in the Court's minimum contacts cases, 
see JACK H. FR!EDENTHAL ET AL., CIVJL PROCEDURE §3.10, at 120 (2d ed. 1993). 
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used in minimum contacts analysis.5 However sound such advice may be, 
the Supreme Court has ignored it. Rather than discarding any of the test's 
factors, the Court has regularly added new factors in a process of gradual 
accumulation, each addition aggravating the test's ambiguity and 
complexity. 
In this Essay, I suggest several steps to improve the Supreme Court's 
approach to minimum contacts analysis. Though they necessitate some 
modification of current doctrine, these steps require neither radical 
alteration of the test's current factors nor abandonment of any of its 
purposes. I propose a new way of looking at the Court's minimum contacts 
analysis that better explains and integrates the factors, temporal 
perspectives, and purposes that presently figure in the analysis. My 
approach draws on criminal law, analogizing a state's imposition of the 
burdens of jurisdiction to its imposition of a criminal sanction. It sees the 
minimum contacts doctrine as driven by two goals-individual desert and 
social utility-with quite different temporal orientations and critelia. This 
approach uses one group of factors that adopts an ex post viewpoint looking 
back to the time before initiation of litigation (for example, the defendant's 
past conduct and mental state) to assess whether the defendant deserves 
imposition of the burden of the forum's exercise of jurisdiction. It collects 
in a second group factors that adopt an ex ante viewpoint looldng forward 
to the time after initiation of the litigation (for example, efficiency and 
party convenience) and uses them to determine whether the forum's 
exercise of jurisdiction will prove socially useful. 
While Part I asks the Court to reconsider the impulses behind the 
minimum contacts factors it already uses, Parts II, III, IV, and V argue that 
the Court should change how it handles those factors. In Part II, I suggest a 
way to restate the purposes animating the minimum contacts doctrine. In 
Part III, I examine the Court's chaotic treatment of mental state in its 
minimum contacts cases and suggest that its julisprudence may be 
improved through the use of clearer distinctions among various types of 
mental state, greater consistency in identifying the focal point of the mental 
state inquiry, and the adoption of a purely objective standard. 
Like criminal punishment imposed by the state on an individual, which 
can range in severity from probation to capital punishment, the burden a 
state imposes on a defendant when it requires her to defend away from 
home can vary dramatically in severity. In Part IV, I maintain that the Court 
5. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A 
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1112, !137-42 (1981) (arguing for a test based on 
inconvenience to the defendant, burden on the plaintiff, and the state's interest in adjudicating the 
controversy); Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REv. 729, 811-12 (1988) (advocating an abandonment of the test's 
prospective factors). 
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needs to recognize the significance of the wide variability in the potential 
severity of this burden by requiring proportionality, as it does with criminal 
punishment, between the degree of burden imposed on the defendant and 
the degree of justification required by the minimum contacts test. In other 
words, the minimum contacts test should openly adopt a relative rather than 
an absolute standard, a sliding scale in which the degree of justification 
required varies in direct proportion to the degree of burden imposed. Such a 
proportionality requirement would compel the Court to examine in detail 
the practical impact on the defendant of the forum's assertion of 
jurisdiction, something it does not presently do. 
An important remaining issue is how to integrate desert and utility, with 
their distinct perspectives and criteria, into a single minimum contacts test. 
In Part V, I address this issue and argue that the Supreme Court's failure to 
aclrnowledge and address the basic tension between desert and utility is a 
primary source of incoherence in its minimum contacts cases. I urge the 
Court to address this issue openly and to use some form of mixed theory to 
balance the tension that can arise between desert and utility, as scholars 
have done to accommodate a similar tension between desert and utility in 
criminal law. In Part V, I propose a possible mixed theory that I suggest 
makes the best sense of the ingredients found in current minimum contacts 
doctrine. 
I. DESERT AND UTILITY 
This Essay claims that substantive criminal law concepts such as desert, 
mens rea, and proportionality offer a vantage point from which to gain a 
fresh perspective on why the minimum contacts doctrine seems so muddled 
and how it might be clarified. It relies on a seemingly implausible 
analogy-a comparison that at first blush seems more arbitrary than apt. 
We are~ accustomed to using these criminal doctrines to grapple with issues 
such as the death penalty and the imposition of harsh prison terms on drug 
offenders. Initially, it seems a bit awkward to draw on them in addressing 
less dramatic issues such as the appropriateness of requiring a New York 
Audi dealer to defend a tort action in Oklahoma or a Michigan Burger King 
franchisee to defend a breach of contract action in Florida. If one is to 
choose an area of substantive law from which to bootleg ideas to aid 
minimum contacts doctrine, civil subjects such as tort or contract law would 
seem more fitting.6 
6. For explorations of analogies between minimum contacts doctrine and the laws of contract 
and tort, see Brilmayer, supra note 4; and Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process 
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REv. 77, 92-93. 
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Indeed, there are good reasons to be wary of a comparison between 
criminal law and minimum contacts. The criminal law doctrines discussed 
in this Essay are substantive, while minimum contacts is quintessentially 
procedural. These criminal doctrines are used to determine the imposition 
of criminal liability. The minimum contacts test, by contrast, does not 
directly address the ultimate imposition of liability, either criminal or civil. 
It simply controls whether an individual may be exposed to potential civil 
liability by being required to participate in a lawsuit. Finally, substantive 
criminal law doctrines and the minimum contacts test exist and function in 
two distinct legal arenas, criminal and civil. They share some common 
features, such as the same evidence rules, but they also have many 
important differences, such as the ultimate sanctions available and distinct 
burdens of proof. 
Despite these seeming incongruities, and perhaps in large measure 
precisely because of them, these comparisons between minimum contacts 
doctrine and criminal law demonstrate the need to look in a fresh way at a 
doctrine quite familiar in its failings. The novel and seemingly arbitrary 
connection between criminal law doctrines and minimum contacts goes to 
the heart of the Supreme Court's fumbling in its minimum contacts cases. It 
reveals an uncanny and instructive resemblance between the assessment of 
substantive criminal liability and the procedural calculus involved in 
determining a just and pragmatic approach to state comt jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants. 
On reflection, the resonance between these two seemingly disparate 
areas of law is not so surprising. Both areas deal with the exercise of 
government power over an individual and the need to resolve a tension 
between the one and the many, the individual and the state. The 
resemblance in legal doctrines responding to these common issues reflects 
not only shared intuitions about how government should treat individuals 
but also the application of general philosophical viewpoints that may be 
applied to many legal rules, not just those dealing with criminal punishment 
and jurisdiction. Both criminal desert theory and minimum contacts 
doctrine, for example, emphasize a reciprocity between the benefits 
received by an individual from a government and the burdens that a 
government may legitimately impose on an individual. This shared focus 
simply reflects the application in two quite different contexts of what 
political philosophers describe more general! y as a "benefaction 
principle." 7 And the competitions one finds between desert and utility in 
criminal law and minimum contacts are simply instances of the rivalry one 
finds in moral philosophy and law between deontological, rights-oriented 
7. Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 
363 (1990). 
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perspectives and consequentialist, utilitarian perspectives.8 The advantage 
of analogizing to criminal law is that these tensions are more dramatically 
and clearly illustrated and our moral intuitions about desert and 
proportionality more clearly developed in the criminal than in the 
jurisdictional setting. 
A. Current Doctrine 
To assess my argument for the explanatory power of the criminal law 
analogy in clarifying the muddle of minimum contacts doctrine, it is 
necessary first to examine that muddle. To help my civil procedure class 
track the minimum contacts test's expansion, I ask them to keep a 
cumulative list of factors that the Court claims to use in determining the 
validity of a state court's assertion of jurisdiction over a nomesident 
defendant. When finished, the list typically looks like this: 
FIGURE 1. MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS 
CURRENT FACTORS 
Defendant's Conduct 
Benefits to Defendant 






• Effective relief 
Forum's Interests 
• Providing forum to citizen 
• Regulating defendant 
Location of Witnesses 
Defendant's Mental State 
Effects of Defendant's Conduct 
Conduct of Intervening Actors 
Judicial System's Interest 
• Efficiency 
States' Shared Interest 
• Furthering social policies 
Other Nations' Interests 
CD Procedural and substantive 
policies 
Federal Govermnent's Interest 
• Foreign policy 
This motley assortment of factors:._ranging from the mental state of the 
defendant t9 foreign policy-presents a challenge to the construction of a 
coherent minimum contacts test. Grouping these jumbled factors by 
temporal viewpoint helps give them some coherence. Factors such as the 
8. For a description of competing intrinsic and instrumental approaches to due process, see 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERJCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 10-7, at 663 (2d ed. 1988). 
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defendant's conduct and mental state reflect a retrospective (i.e., ex post) 
viewpoint that looks back from the initiation of the lawsuit. Others factors 
such as efficiency and the plaintiff's convenience reflect a prospective (i.e., 
ex ante) viewpoint that looks forward from initiation of the lawsuit. 
Regrouped according to temporal viewpoint, the factors appear as follows: 
FIGURE 2. CURRENT FACTORS SORTED BY VIEWPOINT 
RETROSPECTIVE PROSPECTIVE 
Defendant's Conduct Defendant's Interest 
Defendant's Mental State o Convenience 
Effects of Defendant's Conduct Plaintiff's Interests 
Benefits to Defendant • Convenience 
Relation of Claim to Defendant's • Effective relief 
Conduct Forum's Interests 
Conduct of Intervening Actors • Providing forum to citizen 
e Regulating defendant 
Location of Witnesses 
Judicial System's Interest 
• Efficiency 
States' Shared Interests 
• Furthering social policies 
Other Nations' Interests 
• Procedural and substantive 
policies 
Federal Government's Interest 
• Foreign policy 
How does one explain and integrate the use of so many disparate 
factors and two quite different temporal perspectives? As the following 
brief review of the history and current state of the minimum contacts 
doctrine reveals, the Court's minimum contacts cases fail to answer this 
question satisfactorily. Ultimately, they leave unresolved two basic issues: 
(1) the test's requirements; and (2) the test's purposes. The remainder of 
Part I addresses the test's requirements. Part II turns to the test's purposes. 
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B. The Test's Requirements 
1. A History of Accumulation 
Those who find more coherence than confusion in minimum contacts 
doctrine often describe its history as an evolution9 and refinemene0 of the 
test. In my view, however, the Supreme Court's succession of minimum 
contacts cases reveals a process more aptly described as accumulation than 
evolution or refinement. Evolution and refinement suggest not just change 
but improvement.ll Though the test has clearly grown more complex over 
the years, its murkiness and the constant criticism to which it has been 
subjected suggest that this complexity has hampered rather than improved 
the test. Evolution and refinement also convey a sense of leaving something 
behind, shedding inferior adaptive traits, distilling out imperfections. 12 
Unlike the automobile, the design of which evolved from a state of 
crudeness to refinement as it abandoned the carburetor for fuel injection 
and drum for disk brakes, the minimum contacts test is like an old house 
whose owners continually added furniture over the years without discarding 
any old items. 
Intemational Shoe Co. v. Washington13 provides the foundation for the 
test's accumulation of factors. Using an almost exclusively ex post 
viewpoint, that opinion focuses primarily on the defendant's past conduct, 
referred to as its "activities," 14 such as employing forum residents, renting 
forum property, and shipping products to the forum. It mentions other 
retrospective factors, such as forum-related benefits received by the 
defendant and the relation between the defendant's conduct and the 
plaintiff's claim, but gives them scant attention. Intemational Shoe contains 
only a trace of a prospective component. It states that an "estimate of the 
9. See, e.g., William J. Knudsen, Jr., Keeton, Calder, Helicopteros and Burger King-
International Shoe's Most Recent Progeny, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 831 (1985) ("[T]he 
doctrine of International Shoe is not set in marble; it has continued to evolve .... "); Graham C. 
Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 86 (1987) (referring 
to the "evolution of the 'minimum contacts' doctrine"). 
10. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHALET AL., supra note 4, § 3.11, at 127 (using the title "Refinements 
of the Basic Standard: The Requirement of a Purposeful Act and Foreseeability" to describe the 
section dealing with the history of minimum contacts from McGee v. International Life Insurance 
Co. through Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 707 (2d ed. 1995) (stating in reference to the Court's 
minimum contacts cases from World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson through Asahi that 
"[a]s [the Court] decides more cases, it refines the minimum contacts standard"). 
11. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 471, 1039 (2d college ed. 1982) 
(defining "evolution" as "a gradual process in which something changes into a different and 
usually more complex or better form" and "refme" as "to free from coarse 
characteristics .... [t]o become free of impurities"). 
12. See id. 
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
14. ld. at 314-15,320. 
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inconveniences" to the defendant from trial in the forum is "relevant" to 
the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction.15 But the opinion makes 
no effort to estimate those inconveniences or otherwise to apply this 
prospective factor in approving the State of Washington's exercise of., 
jurisdiction. 16 
The factors mentioned in International Shoe, displayed graphically, are 
as follows: 
FIGURE 3. INTERNATIONAL SHOE FACTORS 
RETROSPECTIVE PROSPECTIVE 
Defendant's Conduct Defendant's Interest 
Benefits to Defendant • Convenience 
Relation of Claim to Defendant's 
Conduct 
2. New Factors, Shifting Viewpoints 
Five years after International Shoe, a minimum contacts case seldom 
mentioned in civil procedure casebooks or academic commentary, 
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corporation Commission, 17 
foreshadowed two persistent problems in minimum contacts doctrine: the 
unexplained addition of new factors and the inconsistent shifting of 
temporal viewpoint. As in International Shoe, the opinion in Travelers 
considers retrospective factors such as the conduct of the defendant 
insurance company. But unlike International Shoe, it blends ex post and ex 
ante viewpoints and gives equal attention to prospective factors never 
mentioned in International Shoe, including the forum's interest in 
regulating the defendant's conduct, the plaintiffs' inconvenience in using an 
alternate forum, and the likely location of witnesses. 18 Justice Black, author 
of the Travelers opinion, complained in a separate opinion in International 
Shoe that the minimum contacts test's criteria were "vague." 19 In 
Travelers, Justice Black exploited that vagueness to add several new factors 
without acknowledgment or justification. All Justice Black had to say about 
these new factors was that some of them "have been given great weight in 
15. !d. at 317. 
· 16. See id. at 310-26. 
17. 339 U.S. 643 (1950). 
18. See id. at 648-49. 
19. 326 U.S. at 323 (opinion of Black, J.). 
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applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens." 20 The following graphic 
illustrates the minimum contacts factors after Travelers. 
FIGURE 4. FACTORS AFTER TRAVELERS 
RETROSPECTIVE PROSPECTNE 
Defendant's Conduct Defendant's Interest 
Benefits to Defendant • Convenience 
Relation of Claim to Defendant's Plaintiff's Interest 
Conduct • Convenience 
Forum Interests 
• Regulating defendant 
Location of Witnesses 
From International Shoe to Travelers, then, the Court shifted temporal 
viewpoint. It also added new factors without admitting that it was doing so, 
justifying the additions, relating them to any underlying purpose, or 
attempting to assimilate the new factors with those found in International 
Shoe. And by adding prospective factors taken from the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, the Court created redundancy and blurred the distinction 
between that doctrine and the minimum contacts test. 
Seven years later, a pair of oft-cited minimum contacts cases continued 
this pattern of unexplained accumulation. McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co. 21 resembles Travelers in its reliance on a blend of 
retrospective and prospective viewpoints and its use of the prospective 
factors introduced by Travelers. But Hanson v. Denckla,22 decided just six 
months after McGee, returns to a predominantly ex post perspective and a 
focus on conduct that is reminiscent of International Shoe. Hanson focuses 
almost exclusively on the defendant's lack of conduct connected to the 
forum, stating that the minimum contacts issue "is resolved in this case by 
considering the acts of the trustee." 23 
Hanson also adds a new retrospective factor. In describing the conduct 
required to establish minimum contacts, Chief Justice Warren wrote that 
what is "essential in each case" is "some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
20. 339 U.S. at 649. 
21. 355 u.s. 220 (1957). 
22. 357 u.s. 235 (1958). 
23. ld at 254 (emphasis added). 
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forum State." 24 It is not clear from the opinion whether Justice Warren 
intended to treat the defendant's mental state as a distinct factor, since 
elsewhere in the Hanson opinion he mentioned only conduct-using words 
such as "activity" and "act" or "acts" -without referring to an 
accompanying mental state. Nonetheless, this passage gave rise in later 
cases to the "purposeful availment" requiremenf5 and added the 
defendant's mental state to the list of minimum contacts factors. Again, a 
new factor was added to the test without acknowledgment, justification, or 
integration. 
The Court continued in later cases to shift temporal viewpoint. Though 
the decisions mention both retrospective and prospective factors, an ex post 
viewpoint dominates cases such as World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson26 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 21 In Asahi Metal Industry 
Co. v. Superior Court/8 by contrast, the resolution of the minimum contacts 
issue turns on prospective factors. Unable in Asahi to muster a majority on 
the adequacy of the retrospective components, the Court for the first time 
resolved a case on purely prospective grounds.29 Thus, in the roughly forty 
years from International Shoe to Asahi, the Comt transformed the 
prospective side of the minimum contacts formula from a single factor of 
little apparent significance in International Shoe to multiple factors capable 
on their own, as in Asahi, of defeating a state's exercise of jurisdiction. 
The pattern of casually adding new factors-both retrospective and 
prospective-repeats in other cases, resulting in the cumulative list that 
appears in Figures 1 and 2 above. Calder v. Jones/0 for example, added an 
"effects" tesf1 to the retrospective side, emphasizing the past effects in the 
forum of the defendant's conduct.32 Asahi added "the procedural and 
substantive policies of other nations" and the "Federal Government's 
24. ld. at 253 (emphasis added). 
25. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.11, at 129 ("In both [Kulka v. Superior 
Court and World-Wide Volkswagen] the Court ... places in the foreground the Hanson 
requirement that the defendant purposefully avail himself of the state's benefits."). 
26. 444 u.s. 286 (1980). 
27. 471 u.s. 462 (1985). 
28. 480 u.s. 102 (1987). 
29. See id. at 113-16. In Asahi, the Court began its consideration of the prospective factors by 
listing them as follows: 
We have previously explained that the determination of the reasonableness of the 
exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. A 
court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and 
the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination "the 
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies." 
ld. at 113 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). 
30. 465 u.s. 783 (1984). 
31. ld. at 787 n.6; see also MARCUS ETAL., supra note 10, at 727-28. 
32. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
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interest in its foreign relations policies" to the prospective side.33 The 
Court's expansion of factors has increased the indeterminacy and 
manipulability of the test. With more factors and no principle to guide or 
constrain its choice, the Court has greater freedom to choose one or more 
factors to determine the outcome-for example, conduct in International 
Shoe, effects in Calder, and inconvenience in Asahi. If the test in its 
indetenninacy can be compared to a shell game, over the years the Court 
has introduced more and more shells of which to keep track. 
3. Retrospective Justice vs. Prospective Utility 
As this brief survey of the Supreme Court's minimum contacts cases 
demonstrates, a central problem in making sense of current minimum 
contacts doctrine is the lack of a clear foundation to anchor and explain its 
amorphous conglomeration of factors and use of different temporal 
viewpoints. I suggest grounding the test in two principles: desert and utility. 
Desert anchors and explains the retrospective factors; utility anchors and 
explains the prospective factors. These principles give each cluster of 
factors a unifying focal point and provide the entire minimum contacts test 
with two distinct focal points. Explicit articulation of these principles also 
helps reveal the latent tension in personal jurisdiction between individual 
desert and collective utility, a tension current minimum contacts doctrine 
masks. A brief explanation of the source of this approach aids in 
understanding it. 
Different philosophical paradigms compete to explain the underlying 
purposes of c1iminal and tort law. One paradigm, to which I refer as 
retrospective justice, looks to the past, focuses on individual actors, and 
uses noninstrumental moral criteria. This viewpoint, which in criminal law 
is often labeled "just deserts," sees retribution as the proper driving force 
behind criminal punishment.34 On this view, criminals should be punished 
because they deserve it based on past wrongdoing, not because punishment 
may provide some future benefit to society (such as reducing future crime) 
by incapacitating or deterring criminals. Just deserts uses a retrospective 
point of view and metes out punishment in proportion to the defendant's 
crime. This calculation is based on criteria of individual accountability such 
as the blameworthiness reflected in the defendant's conduct and mental 
state. In tort law, the retrospective justice paradigm is often called 
33. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115. 
34. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 70-73 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1958) (1821 ); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100-01 (John 
Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797); MichaelS. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, 
in REsPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); 
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968). 
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"corrective justice." 35 Like the retributivists in criminal law, corrective 
justice proponents use a retrospective viewpoint, looking back at the 
respective moral rights and responsibilities of individual actors, to 
determine the distribution of tort liability. In both criminal law and torts, the 
retrospective justice paradigm is essentially historical, seeking to achieve 
what is "just" -and to prevent what is "unjust" -based on moral 
intuitions about past events and the roles of particular individuals in those 
events. 
The competing viewpoint, to which I refer as the prospective utility 
paradigm, looks to the future rather than the past. It focuses on the interests 
of society rather than on the rights or responsibilities of individuals and 
uses instrumental rather than moral criteria. It sees criminal law as an 
instrument to advance society's interests and metes out punishment 
according to whether that punishment will be socially useful. For example, 
if crime prevention is the criminal justice system's primary goal, then 
punishment is justified if it reduces future crime through deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or incapacitation.36 This viewpoint also sees tort law as an 
instrument for achieving various collective social goals such as deterrence 
or cost-spreading.37 In both criminal law and torts, the prospective utility 
paradigm is essentially predictive rather than historical, seeking what will 
be useful to society in the future rather than the just treatment of individuals 
based on the past. 
In the seeming chaos of the accumulation of factors and shifting 
temporal viewpoints found in the minimum contacts cases, one can 
perceive crude versions of both the retrospective justice and the prospective 
utility paradigms at work on the task of justifying a state's assertion of 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The retrospective component of 
the minimum contacts doctrine may be viewed as corresponding to the 
retrospective justice paradigm in that it seeks to justify the imposition of 
35. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part I, I 
LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of 
Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George P. Fletcher, Faimess and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. 
REv. 537 (1972); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996); Ken Kress, Fomuzlism, Corrective Justice and Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. 
REv. at i (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 
37 (1983). 
36. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon 1996) (1789); Johannes Andenaes, 
Deterrence, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 591,592 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); 
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. ECON. 169 (1968); 
Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (1996). 
37. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Guido Calabresi, Some 
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Richard A. Posner, 
A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
1998] Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts 201 
jurisdiction based on past events, focuses on the individual, and finds 
relevance in its appeal to society's moral intuitions about personal 
responsibility and accountability. Similarly, the prospective component of 
the minimum contacts test may be viewed as corresponding to the 
prospective utility paradigm in that it looks forward, approaches jurisdiction 
as an instrument for achieving social goals, and finds its relevance in its 
appeal to society's sense of pragmatism. 
I suggest bringing these competing paradigms out of the shadows so 
that minimum contacts doctrine can benefit from the structure, order, and 
explanatory power they provide. Bringing these frameworks into the light 
will also help to address directly the problems that they may reuse, 
including their potential incompatibility. 
4. Desert and Minimum Contacts' Retrospective Component 
Why should retrospective factors such as an out-of-state defendant's 
past conduct or mental state have any bearing on the validity of a state 
exercising jurisdiction over the defendant? Why not simply measure the 
validity of jurisdiction according to prospective factors, such as party 
convenience or efficient use of judicial resources? 
Though retrospective factors provided the original building blocks for 
minimum contacts analysis, the case law does not explicitly answer these 
questions. International Shoe brings a realist attitude to the notions of 
"presence" and "consent" that had dominated jurisdictional analysis prior 
to the minimum contacts doctrine, treating them as formalist abstractions 
and looking beyond them to the underlying "contacts." 38 But Intemational 
Shoe does not press further to ask why the contacts themselves are 
significant. Nor has the Court offered any explicit explanation of their 
significance in later cases. In retrospect, the Court seems simply to have 
replaced the formalist abstractions of presence and consent with a different 
abstraction: contacts. 
38. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). Regarding presence, the 
Court stated: 
To say that the corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy due process 
requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the 
courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or 
"presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent 
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due 
process. 
!d. at 316-17. Regarding consent, the Court stated: 
True, some of the decisions holding the corporation amenable to suit have been 
supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its consent to service and suit, 
consent being implied from its presence in the state through the acts of its authorized 
agents .... But more realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were of such 
a nature as to justify the fiction. 
!d. at318. 
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The Court's failure to explain the relevance of the retrospective factors 
to jurisdictional validity may be explained by the intuitive appeal such 
factors have to our sense of "fairness" or "justice." Their relevance may 
seem so obvious as to make it unnecessary to articulate explicitly the 
reasoning that underlies that sense of relevance. In teaching civil procedure, 
for example, I have found that retrospective factors such as the conduct and 
mental state of the defendant and effects caused by the defendant in the 
forum strongly appeal to many students as highly relevant in justifying a 
state's assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident. But it is often difficult 
for those students, as it has been for the Justices of the Supreme Court, to 
articulate the basis for that intuition other than in abstract terms such as 
justice and fairness. This combination of intuitive appeal and difficulty in 
articulating the basis for that appeal resonates with my observations of the 
experience of students of criminal law in confronting retribution and related 
nonconsequentialist views toward the purposes of criminal law. Students in 
my criminal law class routinely find it relatively easy to articulate the 
prospective, utilitarian purposes of punishment-deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation-that treat punishment as an instrument for advancing 
social utility by reducing future crime. But despite their considerable appeal 
to many students, the articulation of nonconsequentialist rationales for 
punishment often proves elusive. 
The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens,39 the classic lifeboat cannibalism 
case, provides a good example. Shipwrecked on the open sea in a small 
boat for twenty-five days, Thomas Dudley and his crew had little food and 
water and no appreciable chance of rescue. Dudley prayed for forgiveness, 
then slit the throat of the cabin boy who lay near death at his feet. Sustained 
by the boy's body and blood until rescued, Dudley was later condemned to 
hang, pardoned, and then used by generations of law professors to explore 
why criminal law punishes. 
In discussing Dudley, I try to force students to grapple with 
nonutilitarian justifications for punishment by arguing that there may be no 
future utility in punishing Dudley. Incapacitation, specific deterrence, and 
rehabilitation do not carry much weight, one may argue, since Dudley, who 
was generally a law-abiding person, was unlikely to be in the same situation 
again. General deterrence may also carry little weight. Future sailors caught 
in the same sort of life-or-death predicament Dudley faced might well be 
unaware of Dudley's fate. They might also be beyond the reach of 
deterrence, incapable of rational calculation, or, even if they do calculate 
rationally, likely to choose the possibility of later punishment-even capital 
punishment-over immediate death by starvation. 
39. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
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While the usefulness of punishing Dudley is certainly debatable, many 
students express a strong moral conviction that Dudley should be punished 
regardless of utility, but they struggle. to articulate the basis for that 
judgment. Often they will say that "justice" demands that Dudley be 
punished regardless of future utility because he purposefully took another's 
life-that is, because of his conduct, his mental state, and the resulting 
death he caused. As these students read further in the casebook, they 
usually embrace the retrospective justice paradigm and begin to articulate 
moral notions of desert, blame, and personal responsibility as the latent 
ideas behind what they earlier described simply as "justice." 
In my civil procedure class, which students take in the &econd semester 
of the first year just after finishing criminal law, I ask students to compare 
justifying a government's exercise of power in imposing jurisdiction on an 
individual in a civil case to a government's exercise of power in imposing 
criminal punishment. What if a court, rather than sentencing Dudley to 
death, had imposed on him the burdens of traveling to a distant location to 
defend a civil suit? What, I jokingly ask, if Dudley had been condemned to 
travel to Florida to engage in franchise litigation with a powerful 
multinational corporation such· as Burger King?40 How would the criminal 
law justify such an admittedly bizarre punishment? How would that 
justification differ from the justification one finds for imposition of the 
same burden under the minimum contacts test? Under one modern mixed 
theory of punishment with which many students are familiar from criminal 
law, the punishment would have to be both useful to society and deserved 
by the individual.41 
This juxtaposition of criminal law and civil procedure sheds an 
interesting light on the Court's minimum contacts cases. The retrospective 
factors of the minimum contacts test, used to constrain government power 
to impose jurisdictional burdens in the civil arena, bear a striking 
resemblance to criminal law doctrines used to constrain government power 
in the criminal arena. The minimum contacts test's conduct factor parallels 
criminal law's actus reus requirement. The mental state and effects factors 
are analogous to mens rea and resulting harm elements in the criminal law, 
used both to limit and to grade criminal liability. By allowing intervening 
actors in the stream of commerce (such as consumer purchasers of a 
product) to insulate a defendant from the imposition of jurisdiction, the 
minimum contacts test's retrospective component resembles the criminal 
40. Cf Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (requiring the defendant-an 
individual franchisee-to travel from Michigan to Florida to defend against Burger King's claims 
of breach of a franchise agreement). 
41. See, e.g., MICHAELS. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 237 (1984) (" [T]he popular form 
of mixed theory ... asserts that punishment is justified if and only if it achieves a net social gain 
and is given to offenders who deserve it."). 
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law's treatment of subsequent actors who insulate from liability earlier 
actors in the chain of causation. 
The retrospective component's use of benefits to the defendant from 
contacts with the forum to justify the imposition of jurisdictional burdens 
does not have a direct analog in criminal law doctrine, but a similar concern 
about reciprocity of benefits and burdens appears in the theoretical 
literature on retribution. In bitemational Shoe, Justice Stone addressed the 
benefits enjoyed by a foreign defendant from its contact with the forum, 
stating that: 
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of 
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and 
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege 
may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise 
out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a 
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit 
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be 
undue.42 
In rationalizing the practice of criminal punishment, Herbert Morris, a 
well-known criminal law theorist usually associated with the "just deserts" 
school, posits an equilibrium of benefits and burdens among the members 
of society similar to the reciprocity of benefits and obligations Justice Stone 
described.43 The burdens emerge when citizens restrain themselves from 
actions that interfere with the rights of others, and the reciprocal benefits lie 
in freedom from interference by others. A criminal act by one member of 
society upsets this equilibrium. In Morris's view, "[j]ustice-that is 
punishing such individuals-restores the equilibrium of benefits and 
burdens by taldng from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the 
debt." 44 In both jurisdiction and criminal law, then, an individual can be 
said to deserve the imposition of government burdens-whether in the form 
of punishment or subjection to jurisdiction-if she has received reciprocal 
benefits from that govemment.45 
I do not wish to overstate the parallels between criminal law and the 
retrospective component of the minimum contacts test; nor do I wish to 
exaggerate their significance. Clearly, imposing criminal punishment on an 
innocent person is an injustice of a different order from imposing civil 
jurisdiction on an undeserving nonresident defendant. Nonetheless, I do 
42. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
43. See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976). 
44. /d. at 34. 
45. See Kogan, supra note 7, at 363 (discussing the grounding of such reciprocity in a 
political" benefaction principle"); see also Brilmayer, supra note 4 (discussing such reciprocity in 
terms of social contracts). 
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think these parallels are more thfu1 coincidental and that they provide 
insight into why the retrospective factors seem so intuitively appealing in 
assessing the validity of jurisdiction. Both jurisdiction and criminal 
punishment present the potential use of government power to coerce 
individual citizens in the name of collective utilitarian goals such as 
reduction of crime or efficient adjudication of cases. In both contexts, we 
seek to limit this potential government coercion of individuals with 
constraints based on the common moral intuition, expressed in the 
"retrospective justice" paradigm, that an individual can appropriately be 
coerced by government to advance collective ends only if the individual 
deserves that coercion. Our notion of desert draws on ideas of 
accountability that in turn derive from notions of free will and choice. 
Herbert Packer, for example, has written that the rationale for the criminal 
law's actus reus requirement rests in part on notions of culpability and that 
[a]mong the notions associated with the concept of "culpability" 
are those of free will and human autonomy .... It is important, 
especially in a society that likes to describe itself as "free" and 
"open," that a government should be empowered to coerce people 
only for what they do and not for what they are.46 
If an individual has made choices-to act, to cause results or effects, to 
receive benefits-then it is just to require that individual to answer for those 
choices.47 In criminal law, one is held to answer by receiving punishment. 
In the jurisdictional context, one is held to answer by having to respond to a 
lawsuit. 
One might object to using desert as a justification for jurisdiction on the 
ground that it inappropriately presupposes wrongdoing on the part of a 
defendant. Imposition of jurisdiction, after all, is simply one step in an 
action that may or may not find the defendant to be a wrongdoer. Moreover, 
some conduct that may support imposition of jmisdiction, such as interstate 
commercial activity, is precisely the sort of activity government 
encourages. The notion of dese1t, however, is not necessarily pejorative. 
Rather than being inherently positive or negative, desert is a relational 
quality that exists between a person and something earned by or owed to 
that person. One may deserve, for example, a reward or a reputation, a 
promotion or a prison term. As these examples illustrate, desert can have 
positive or negative implications depending on what it is that the person is 
46. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74 (1968). 
47. Cf World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) ("People should understand that they are held responsible for the consequences of 
their actions and that in our society most actions have consequences affecting many States. When 
an action in fact causes injury in another State, the actor should be prepared to answer for it 
there .... "). 
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said to deserve.48 This duality is captured in the definition of desert as either 
"a reward or punishment deserved or earned by one's qualities or acts." 49 
In addition to desert's positive and negative forms, this same definition 
illustrates that desert depends on a retrospective assessment of criteria 
closely associated with an individual, such as the person's "qualities or 
acts," and presents a sharp contrast to the sort of predictive, collective cost-
benefit analysis that drives the notion of utility. One may deserve a reward 
for having returned a lost pet, a reputation for dishonesty by having 
cheated, a job promotion by having done one's job well, or a prison term by 
having stolen someone else's money. In each of these examples, the quality 
of desert as something earned or owed based on an individual's past 
conduct remains the same, though what is deserved and the precise basis for 
desert differs in each. I argue that a defendant may similarly be viewed as 
deserving the burdens of jurisdiction based on the minimum contacts 
retrospective factors without implying anything negative, much less 
wrongdoing. 
My aim in transplanting the notion of desert from its familiar 
surroundings in criminal law into the law of personal jurisdiction is not to 
capture the negative implication of wrongdoing that desert carries in the 
criminal context. Rather, I seek to draw on the sense of desert that 
transcends particular contexts and spealcs more generally to the relational 
nature of something earned by or owed to an individual on the basis of 
criteria such as past conduct and mental state. Desert as used in the criminal 
law is simply a vivid illustration of this general sense. I also wish to borrow 
from criminal law the rich blend of criteria-such as conduct, mental state, 
and result-that it uses to determine desert. In criminal law, we move from 
these factors to a finding of desert by an inference labeled "culpability." In 
jurisdiction, I suggest an analogous but not identical inferential step from 
the minimum contacts retrospective factors to a finding of desert, an 
inference more appropriately and neutrally labeled one of responsibility 
rather than culpability. 5° 
48. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 96 (1996) ("The 
striking feature of desert ... is that it comes in both positive and negative forms. We earn money 
and we earn punishment. We are both praised and blamed for our actions. When rewards and 
penalties are just, we say that we deserve them."). 
49. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 610 (1986). 
50. See Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 89 (" [I]mposition of legal burdens on the defendant is 
reasonable only if the defendant was somehow responsible for those occurrences." (emphasis 
added)); cf. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("People should 
understand that they are held responsible for the consequences of their actions and that in our 
society most actions have consequences in other states." (emphasis added)). 
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5. Utility and Minimum Contacts' Prospective Component 
Why should prospective factors such as efficiency, party convenience, 
or impact on foreign policy play a role in the minimum contacts test? Why 
not use only retrospective factors such as past conduct to measure the 
validity of jurisdiction as the Court did in International Shoe? Though the 
Supreme Court has steadily increased the number and importance of the 
prospective factors over the years, as with the retrospective factors it has 
provided no explicit justification for including them in minimum contacts 
analysis other than saying that they are a function of" reasonableness" or 
"fairness." 
As with the retrospective factors, the Court's failure to articulate 
explicitly the relevance of the prospective factors to jurisdictional validity 
may be explained by the intuitive appeal of factors such as efficiency and 
convenience to our sense of pragmatism. Just as we want legal rules to be 
intrinsically just, we also want them to be useful and practical. That 
jurisdictional rules should operate efficiently and be concerned with party 
convenience may appear so self-evident that it might seem unnecessary to 
articulate a justification for incorporating such factors into minimum 
contacts analysis. As George Fletcher has written, "[t]he most common 
mode of moral reasoning in the Anglo-American tradition is cost/benefit 
analysis-the 'balancing' of competing advantages and disadvantages of 
adopting particular courses of action. As the argument goes, all legal 
decisions (by individuals as well as courts) should be judged according to 
their consequences." 51 This tendency toward instrumental thinking is 
reinforced in approaching civil procedure issues such as jurisdiction by the 
inherently instrumental nature of procedural law, which is often viewed as 
simply a means for enforcing substantive law.52 
I find, as Fletcher suggests, that the arguments most readily accessible 
to my students, both in criminal law and civil procedure, are ones geared 
toward instrumental value based on future consequences. In contrast to their 
gradual appreciation of nonconsequentialist arguments such as those based 
on desert, students need little prompting to recognize utilitarian arguments; 
the problem, rather, is how to contain their enthusiasm for these arguments. 
In my view, the history of the minimum contacts test, in particular the 
51. FLETCHER, supra note 48, at 144. 
52. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203-04 (6th ed. 1990) (defining procedure as "the 
mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the substantive law 
which gives or defmes the right"); BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL 
USAGE 697 (2d ed. 1995) ("Procedural law ... consists of the rules by which one establishes 
one's rights, duties, liberties, and powers-either by litigation or otherwise .... [I]n civil law and 
procedure, substantive law defines the rights and duties of persons, while procedural law defines 
the steps in having a right or duty judicially defined or enforced."). 
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growth of the prospective component, reveals that the Supreme Court has 
had a similar problem corralling its enthusiasm for prospective utility. 
A compadson of minimum contacts' prospective factors and climinal 
law's prospective purposes highlights the difficulties inherent in a 
utilitadan approach to minimum contacts. The instrumental purposes of the 
cdrninal law are usually listed as deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. There is plenty of potential for conflict among them. A harsh 
pdson sentence, for example, may generally deter and incapacitate but be 
counterproductive in terms of rehabilitation.53 But the vadous purposes 
share the common goal of advancing a particular form of social utility-
clime reduction. In fact, one commentator describes criminal law as having 
only one prospective purpose-clime reduction-and views deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation as simply three different means of 
pt1rsuing that purpose.54 
Minimum contacts' prospective factors, by contrast, are more plentiful 
and more difficult to integrate than the prospective purposes of criminal 
law. The current list, set forth in Figure 2, features eight such factors, some 
with multiple subcategories, and there is no sign that the Supreme Court 
will not continue to add new ones. Reading through its minimum contacts 
cases, one gets the sense that the Supreme Court has never encountered a 
social objective to which it was unwilling to harness the minimum contacts 
doctrine. Unlike the goal of crime reduction, which provides a unifying 
focal point for cdrninal law's prospective purposes, the only goal that 
unifies prospective minimum contacts factors such as efficiency and foreign 
policy is the highly abstract notion of social utility. 
In addition, application of some of the prospective factors seems 
enormously complicated and raises questions that neither courts nor parties 
to lawsuits seem particularly competent to resolve. Some factors, such as 
the relative convenience to plaintiff and defendant of litigation in the forum 
and the location of witnesses, are straightforward. But assessing a lawsuit's 
impact on foreign policy, by contrast, seems quite difficult. Indeed, the 
foreign policy of the United States is often a complex web of poorly 
articulated and conflicting goals. In Asahi, for example, it is unclear 
53. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher, Some Thoughts About Crime and 
Punishment, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM 1, 3 (Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 
1997). 
I d. 
[P]risons may have disastrous side effects. Today' s inmates call them "crime 
colleges"; the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries used the term" seminaries of vice." 
There seems to be little doubt that prisons breed crime. Inmates are recruited into a 
social system that fits them for careers in crime and for little else. Of course, prisons 
also "cure" crime in the sense that they deter some criminals and, through 
incapacitation, stop some crime from happening. 
54. See Alfred Blumstein, The Search for the Elusive "Common Principle," 82 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 43, 44 (1987). 
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whether allowing Japa.'1ese companies to be sued in U.S. courts advanced or 
obstructed foreign policy toward Japan. Is a court competent to resolve 
these questions, which are usually seen as the exclusive province of the 
executive branch ofthe federal government? Admittedly, foreign policy 
will play a role in a relatively small number of minimum contacts cases. 
But consider the factor of the "shared" . interests of the fifty states in 
advancing their social policies. How is a court to inform itself about what 
those policies are, given that they will doubtless be numerous and 
conflicting? How is it to calculate and measure the impact of assertion of 
jurisdiction on those policies? These strike me as vastly more complicated 
tasks than those presented by other prospective factors such as efficiency, 
party convenience, and the location of witnesses. 
Articulating utility as the driving force behind the prospective factors 
will not solve all these problems, but it at least provides a common-
though fairly abstract-focal point that distinguishes the prospective factors 
from those found in the retrospective component. 
II. THE PURPOSES OF THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST 
Why does the Supreme Court concern itself with limiting the reach of 
state jurisdiction? What underlying purposes drive the minimum contacts 
test? The desert and utility framework set forth in Part I aids in critically 
examining how the Court answers these questions. 
Early cases such as International Shoe, Travelers, and McGee do not 
elaborate on the policies behind the minimum contacts test; they simply say 
it is based on due process. But starting with Hanson, a number of the 
Court's decisions specifically mention two possible purposes: (1) protecting 
the individual defendant from the burdens of jurisdiction; and (2) 
maintaining an appropriate balance of power among the states in our federal 
system of government.55 This Part will examine these two purposes in more 
detail. 
A. Protecting the Individual Defendant 
The Court has expressed concern over protecting individual defendants 
from government imposition of the burden of defending away from home. 
Hanson, for example, speaks of the minimum contacts test as "a guarantee 
55. Burger King, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Hanson all discuss both of these purposes. 
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-72, 472 n.l3 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Coxp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). World-
Wide Volkswagen and Hanson adopt both puxposes, while Burger King adopts only the first and 
appears to abandon the second. Compare Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 n.13, with World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-94, and Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. 
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of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation." 56 World-Wide 
Volkswagen says one of the test's functions is that it "protects the 
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient 
forum." 57 And the defendant's inconvenience in defending away from 
home has often been mentioned as a prospective factor in minimum 
contacts cases since International Shoe.58 
These statements of purpose about protecting the individual are both 
overstated and incomplete. They say that the purpose of the minimum 
contacts test is to immunize and protect defendants from distant and 
inconvenient litigation. Yet under the test the Court actually approves the 
imposition on defendants of distant and inconvenient litigation, as long as 
they have sufficient contacts with the forum. The minimum contacts test 
was not, for example, a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient, distant 
litigation for the defendants in Calder or Burger King. In apparent 
contradiction of Hanson's and World-Wide Volkswagen's promises of 
immunity and protection from inconvenient, distant litigation, the Court 
approved imposition of inconvenient, distant litigation in both cases. In 
Calder, Florida residents were required to defend in California.59 In Burger 
King, a Michigan resident was required to defend in Florida 60 
As Calder and Burger King reveal, Hanson's and World-Wide 
Volkswagen's statements of purpose are overstated in their categorical 
promise of protection from distant and inconvenient litigation. The test's 
protection is, in fact, selective, immunizing some defendants from distant, 
inconvenient litigation but not others. A more accurate statement of the 
function of the minimum contact tests is to distinguish defendants who are 
immunized from the burdens of out-of-state litigation from defendants who 
are not. 
The statements of purpose found in Hanson and World- Wide 
Volkswagen fail to convey the selective nature of the minimum contacts 
test's protections and to reveal either the basis for this selection or the 
relevance of the test's various factors to that selection. If the purpose of the 
test were solely to prohibit the imposition of inconvenient and distant 
litigation, the test would use only an ex ante point of view to assess whether 
the future litigation is "inconvenient and distant" and, if so, to prohibit it. 
Why does the test look back to retrospective factors in making this 
decision? Why does it use prospective factors other than distance and 
56. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251; see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (describing 
the Due Process Clause as a" guarantor against inconvenient litigation"). 
57. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. Burger King describes the test's function as 
protecting "an individual liberty interest" in not being subject to the forum's judgment. Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at471-72. 
58. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
59. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,785-86, 791 (1984). 
60. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 466,487. 
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inconvenience to the defendant? The Court's cases do not explicitly answer 
these questions. 
Viewing desert as the animating purpose of the retrospective 
component fills in some of these gaps. Rather than simply asserting without 
qualification that the test "protects" or "immunizes" defendants from 
"inconvenient or distant litigation," the test's purposes could be stated 
more fully and clearly as protecting a defendant from undeserved burdens 
resulting from the forum's exercise of jurisdiction. This revised statement 
of purpose brings two improvements. First, it openly acknowledges that the 
rule operates selectively. Second, it clearly sets forth desert as the 
retrospective criterion for that selection. 
B. Federalism 
The use of federalism-the concern that states " not reach out beyond 
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal 
system" 61-has waxed and waned in the Court's descriptions of the 
purposes of the minimum contacts test. International Shoe seemed to 
replace territorial sovereignty, which had previously been the lodestar of 
personal jurisdiction,62 with the minimum contacts test.63 Both Hanson and 
World-Wide Volkswagen, however, say that federalism still plays a role in 
personal jurisdiction by including it as one of the dual purposes of the 
minimum contacts test, suggesting that International Shoe's minimum 
contacts test had supplemented rather than replaced the jurisdictional 
doctrine that preceded it.64 But two years after World-Wide Volkswagen, the 
61. World-Wide Volkswagen,"444 U.S. at 292. 
62. For the leading case on territorial sovereignty, see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
See also F'RIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.3, at 98. 
[In Pennoyer, Justice Field] based his theory on two interrelated "principles of public 
law": first, "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over 
persons and property within its territory;" and second, "that no state can exercise direct 
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property within its territory." Thus, each state 
would be exclusively powerful over the persons and property inside its borders and 
absolutely powerless over all persons and property outside those borders. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
!d. 
63. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Th!'! Court wrote: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
64. Hanson states that the minimum contacts test's restrictions are "more than a guarantee of 
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation." Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. They are also "a 
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." !d. Similarly, World-
Wide Volkswagen states that the test has two purposes: "It protects the defendant against the 
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, 
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as 
coequal sovereigns in a federal system." World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
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Court downplayed federalism as one of the test's purposes,65 and five years 
later, the Court apparently abandoned it in a footnote in Burger King.66 The 
current and future status of federaiism as one of the test's purposes is 
subject to debate.67 
The inclusion of federalism as one of the minimum contacts test's 
purposes leads to a number of theoretical and practical problems. The Due 
Process Clause is the constitutional basis of the minimum contacts test;68 it 
is difficult to reconcile concern about balance of power among states with 
that clause's text and history, both of which focus on the impact of the 
exercise of government power on individuals rather than on other 
governments.69 Similarly, federalism is inconsistent with the notion that an 
individual can waive the protections afforded by the minimum contacts 
test.70 
Unlike the burden of having to defend a lawsuit in a distant state, which 
is relatively easy to grasp, it can be hard on a practical level to see one 
state's exercise of jurisdiction over a sister state's citizen as a serious threat 
to our federal system. The United States' national fabric has become so 
tight and interstate activity, including the appearance of citizens of one state 
in the courts of another, has become so common that one state's exercise of 
jurisdiction over the citizen of another state seems entirely consistent 
with-rather than antithetical to-the current realities of the federal system. 
And at a time when states are concerned with the growing size of their 
65. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, Justice White stated 
for the Court: 
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied to 
state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-
a-vis other States . 
. . . The restriction on state sovereign power ... however, must be seen as 
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the 
Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism 
concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it 
would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions 
cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to 
powers from which he may otherwise be protected. 
456 U.S. 694,702 n.IO (1982). 
66. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.l3 (1985) ("Although this 
protection operates to restrict state power, it 'must be seen as ultimately a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause' rather than as a function 'of 
federalism concerns."' (citation omitted)). 
67. Compare Kogan, supra note 7, at 262-70 (arguing that federalism is an important aspect 
of the debate about personal jurisdiction), with Redish, supra note 5, at 1120 (arguing for the 
abandonment of federalism as an underlying purpose of the minimum contacts test). 
68. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311, 316. 
69. See Redish, supra note 5, at 1115. 
70. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 n.lO. 
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courts' caseloads,71 is it clear that a defendant's home state is likely to feel 
slighted if the forum pays the cost of resolving plaintiff's claim? 
It is also hard to grasp federalism's contribution to minimum contacts 
analysis. Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen, which advance federalism 
as one of the test's purposes, do not seem markedly different from Burger 
King, which rejects federalism, at least not in a way that can be linked to 
acceptance or rejection of federalism. And the Court has never stated 
precisely how the minimum contacts test gives expression to federalism. 
Adopting the desert and utility framework described in Part I will not 
resolve the problems raised by federalism. But, as outlined in Part V, a 
mixed theory built on this framework allows for federalism to find explicit 
expression in the minimum contacts test. 
C. Utility 
The purpose of advancing prospective utility is apparent in the Supreme 
Court's minimum contacts cases. Yet unlike the goals of protecting the 
individual defendant and federalism, the Court never explicitly identifies it 
as a concern animating the minimum contacts test. Nonetheless, a utilitarian 
sensibility about the usefulness of the forum state's exercise of jurisdiction 
pervades many passages in its minimum contacts cases, such as 
International Shoe's reference to "fair and orderly administration of the 
laws" as a purpose of the Due Process Clause.72 The Court's steady 
expansion of the prospective factors used in the minimum contacts test, 
reviewed above and enumerated in Figure 2, also indicates increasing 
concern with assessing the future usefulness of a forum's exercise of 
jurisdiction. Will it be efficient? Will it make pragmatic sense in terms of 
witness location? Will it advance the forum's interest in providing a forum 
for one of its citizens or regulating the defendant's conduct? Will it help the 
states advance their shared social policies? How will it affect the federal 
government's foreign policy interests? Each of these questions looks to the 
consequences of the exercise of jurisdiction and views the exercise of 
jurisdiction as an instrument to be evaluated in light of those consequences. 
The Court's vocabulary can mask this fairly obvious concern with 
utility. For example, the Court sometimes uses the terms 
"reasonableness" 73 or "fairness" 74 in contexts that make it clear that the 
71. For a critical review of the perceived "litigation explosion" that has caused this concern, 
see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and 
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 
(1983). 
72. Intemational Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
73. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
74. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,292 (1980). 
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real concern is utility. The use of the term "fairness" to describe an ex ante 
inquiry into utility is particularly confusing because fairness is commonly 
used to express values at odds with utility.75 
Articulating utility as the animating purpose of the prospective 
component would simply bring express acknowledgment to what is obvious 
but unacknowledged in the Court's minimum contacts cases: Utility has 
come to play an increasingly prominent role in minimum contacts analysis. 
It also allows us to confront openly the challenge of integrating utility with 
the purposes that the Court has openly acknowledged: protecting the 
individual and preserving federalism. 
III. MENTAL STATE 
In this part, I examine the Supreme Court's use of the defendant's 
mental state as a retrospective criterion for assessing the defendant's 
"jurisdictional desert." Following Hanson's unexplained injection of 
mental state into the minimum contacts formula, 76 later cases such as 
World- Wide Volkswagen and Burger King make it an analytical focal point. 
In their imprecision in handling the issue of mental state and the resulting 
confusion, these cases replicate judicial treatment of mens rea, the 
"requisite but elusive" mental element in criminal law. 77 Comparing 
criminal law's treatment of mens rea with minimum contacts' treatment of 
mental state helps to expose some sources of the latter's confusion and to 
reveal some potential remedies. 
A. Criminal Law's Treatment of Mens Rea 
A persistent problem in the legal treatment of mental state has been a 
failure to distinguish clearly between different mental states such as 
purpose, negligence, and recklessness. For example, "intent" commonly 
means the subjective mental state of having something as one's conscious 
object. It is synonymous with "purpose." 78 But in criminal law, judges have 
often made intent into a term of art, expanding its technical legal meaning 
75. See, e.g., Brian Barry, Justice and Faimess, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 333 (Joel Feinberg 
& Hyman Gross eds., 2d ed. 1980). 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
77. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952), for example, Justice Jackson 
commented on "the variety, disparity and confusion of [judicial] definitions of the requisite but 
elusive mental element" in criminal law. Sirnilarly, the Model Penal Code's drafters spoke of 
"the obscurity with which the culpability requirement is often treated." MoDEL PENAL CODE § 
2.02 commentary at 230 (1985). 
78. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 1!, at 592 (defining "intent" as 
"[t]hat which is intended; purpose" and "intend" as "[t]o have in mind some purpose or 
design"). 
1998] Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts 215 
beyond its common meaning to include mental states other than purpose, 
such as negligence and recklessness.79 In doing so, they have blurred 
distinctions with moral and practical significance for grading and 
punishment. 
Intent in the common meaning is subjective and associated with a high 
level of culpability. Intentional homicide, for example, typically is 
classified as murder, one of the most serious of criminal offenses in terms 
of punishment and stigma. 80 Negligence conveys the inadvertent taking of a 
foreseeable risk,81 is typically characterized as an objective mental state, 
and is generally <viewed as a far less culpable mental state than intent. 
Negligent homicide, for example, receives a much lighter sanction than 
murder.82 Recklessness is a mixed subjective/objective mental state in 
which an actor actually foresees a risk and nonetheless acts.83 It falls 
79. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(e), at 223 (2d 
ed. 1986). The authors write: 
[T]he phrase "criminal intent" is sometimes used to refer to criminal negligence or 
recklessness. Similarly, the notion of 'constructive intent' has been used by some 
courts; it is first asserted that intent is required for all crimes, and then it is added that 
such intent may be inferred from recklessness or negligence. It would make for clearer 
analysis if courts would merely acknowledge that for some crimes intent is not needed 
and that recklessness or negligence will suffice. 
ld. (footnote omitted); see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 832-
33 (3d ed. 1982). Perkins and Boyce write: 
The phrase 'criminal intent' is one that has been bandied about with various meanings 
not carefully distinguished .... Often it is used to include criminal negligence as well 
as an actual intent to do the harmful deed, although at other times such negligence is 
referred to as a substitute, so to speak, for criminal intent in connection with certain 
offenses. 
I d. at 835. 
At least two cases exemplify the phenomenon of courts' including recklessness or 
negligence within the legal meaning of intent. See Woodward v. State, 144 So. 895, 896 (Miss. 
1932) ("Intent is a necessary element of assault and battery ... [that] may be committed with a 
motor vehicle by striking a person, or a vehicle in which he is riding, either intentionally or by 
driving so negligently as to constitute a reckless disregard of human life and safety."); Pool v. 
State, 13 S.E. 556, 557 (Ga. 1891) ("The law infers guilty intention from reckless conduct; and 
where the recklessness is of such character as to justify this inference, it is the same as if the 
defendant had deliberately intended the act committed."). 
80. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (West 1983) (stating that murder is 
punishable by death or life imprisonment). 
I d. 
81. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(d). 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists 
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. 
82. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4(1). Negligent homicide is a third degree felony. 
See id. § 210.4(2). A third degree felony is punishable with a sentence of one to five years. See id. 
§ 6.06(3). 
83. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(c). 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element 
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between negligence and intent in culpability. Recklessness normally 
qualifies one for manslaughter, which falls between murder and negligent 
homicide in the hierarchy of criminal homicide.84 Neither negligence nor 
recklessness shares the purposive quality of intent. The use by judges of the 
word " intent" to encompass three such distinct mental states, 85 two of 
which differ significantly from the meaning of intent in common use, has 
been a perennial source of semantic and conceptual confusion in criminal 
law. 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith,86 an English homicide case, 
provides a classic example of conflating negligence and intent and 
demonstrates the parallels between judicial fumbling with mental state in 
criminal law and in minimum contacts doctrine. Charged with killing a 
police officer, the defendant in Smith lacked purpose to kill the officer but 
was nonetheless prosecuted for murder under a theory that intent to inflict 
grievous bodily harm qualified the defendant for murder. 87 As the drafters 
of the Model Penal Code noted in criticizing the case, Smith "effectively 
equated" such intent "with what the defendant as a reasonable man must 
be taken to have contemplated, thus erecting an objective rather than a 
subjective inquiry to determine what the defendant 'intended."' 88 In short, 
Smith treats negligence regarding grievous bodily harm as synonymous 
with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and in doing so creates a crime of 
negligent murder. 
B. Purpose and Foreseeability in Minimum Contacts Analysis 
In minimum contacts cases such as World- Wide Volkswagen and 
Burger King, the Supreme Court treats the word "purposeful" with 
precisely the same imprecision Smith displays regarding intent. 89 One 
would think that Hanson's purposeful availment requirement would require 
actual, subjective purpose. But as Smith did with intent, World- Wide 
Volkswagen and Burger King define purpose as an objective mental state of 
foreseeability similar to negligence. 
!d. 
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, 
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known 
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation. 
84. See, e.g., id. § 210.3(l)(a). Manslaughter is a second degree felony. See id. § 210.3(2). A 
second degree felony is punishable with a sentence from one to ten years. See id. § 6.06(2). 
85. See cases cited supra note 79. 
86. 1961 App. Cas. 290 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
87. See id. at 299, 333-34. 
88. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02 commentary at 234 (1985). 
89. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-76 (1985); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-98 (1980). 
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Burger King, for example, describes the critical mental state as one of 
purpose. 90 But two sentences after stating that "the constitutional 
touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established 
'minimum contacts' in the forum State," 91 the Court states that what is 
"critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct and 
connection with the forum State are such that [the defendant] should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in the forum.92 Just as Smith 
did with intent in the context of murder, the Supreme Court here effectively 
equates the subjective mental state of purpose with what a defendant should 
reasonably anticipate, establishing an objective standard closely akin to 
negligence as the meaning of purpose. Immediately after this passage, the 
Court returns to discussing purposeful availment, using words such as 
"deliberately" 93 that are consistent with purpose but inconsistent with the 
objective mental state of what the defendant should reasonably anticipate. 
Other passages in the same case describe the required mental state as one of 
"expectation," 94 a state of awareness more consistent with recklessness or 
knowledge than either purpose or what the defendant should anticipate. 
These passages from Burger King suggest a "triple contradiction" about 
whether the critical mental state in minimum contacts is one of purpose, 
awareness, or inadvertence.95 
This comparable clumsiness in the handling of mental state in criminal 
law and minimum contacts is not surprising. Given that the Justices of the 
Supreme Court, like other judges, historically have tended to bungle mental 
state in criminal law,96 a similar lack of dexterity in the context of 
jurisdiction seems entirely consistent. What is disappointing, though, is the 
90. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473-74 ("[A] forum legitimately may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who 'pu1posejully directs' his activities toward forum 
residents .... [W]here individuals 'purposefully derive benefit' from their interstate activities, it 
may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in other states for consequences that 
arise proximately from such activities .... " (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
91. I d. at 474 (emphasis added). 
92. !d. (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297) (emphasis added). 
93. !d. at 475. 
94. !d. at 473 (" [T]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause 
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of 
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers." (emphasis added)). 
95. Jerome Hall criticized the phrase "wilful, wanton negligence" used by courts to describe 
criminal mens rea as suggesting "a triple contradiction." Negligence implies inadvertence, wilful 
implies intent, and wanton implies recklessness. For an explication of Hall's argument, see 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 242 (1985): 
As Jerome Hall has put it, the judicial "opinions run in terms of 'wanton and wilful 
negligence,' 'gross negligence,' and more illuminating yet, 'that degree of negligence 
that is more than the negligence required to impose tort liability.' The apex of this 
infelicity is 'wilful, wanton negligence,' which suggests a triple contradiction-
'negligence' implying inadvertence; 'wilful,' intention; and 'wanton' recklessness." 
96. See generally Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 
107 (describing the Supreme Court's "inadequate performance" in dealing with mens rea, "an 
increasingly important area of its adjudication"). · 
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timing of the confusion found in cases such as Burger King and World-
Wide Volkswagen. By the 1980s, when these opinions were written, many 
states had adopted the Model Penal Code's precise and simplified treatment 
of mental state, resulting in clearer, more consistent judicial treatment of 
criminal mens rea issues in state courts.97 Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court's handling of mental state in its minimum contacts cases shows no 
similar signs of improvement. 
C. Framing the Issue of Mental State 
In addition to its failure to distinguish clearly among different mental 
states, the relational nature of mental states gives rise to a second problem 
in the Court's minimum contacts cases. Clearly, one may simultaneously 
have different mental states regarding different things, such as purpose 
regarding the act of driving a car but ignorance or negligence regarding the 
fact that the car contains marijuana.98 Clarity and consistency in framing the 
issue of mental state allows us to analyze an individual's mental state with 
precision. 
The minimum contacts cases are wildly inconsistent in their framing of 
the mental state question. The phrase "purposeful availment" indicates that 
the critical mental state pertains to availment, but the Court never defines 
availment. In the passage from Burger King quoted above in which the 
Court gives purpose an objective meaning, the Court says that the 
defendant's mental state about " 'being haled into court"' in the forum is 
critical. 99 Other passages suggest that the critical mental state pertains to the 
defendant's own conduct, 100 the purchase of a product by forum 
consumers, 101 and the benefits received from the forum. 102 
This chaotic treatment of mental state exacerbates the test's uncertainty 
and unpredictability. In particular, the lack of consistency about the critical 
mental state makes the test highly manipulable. The Court can determine 
that the defendant does or does not have the required mental state by 
selectively choosing the focal point for the mental state analysis. That 
97. See Ronald L. Gainer, The Culpability Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS 
L.J. 575 (1988) ("[T]he Code has promoted clearer, more objective thinking about mental 
elements of offenses."). 
98. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (involving a defendant 
who admitted to driving his car purposefully across the Mexico-U.S. border but claimed he did 
not know that the car contained drugs). 
99. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 
100. See id. at 475-76. 
101. See id. at 473. 
!02. See id. at 473-74. 
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choice of focal point currently remains unexamined in the Court's cases and 
therefore unconstrained by any articulated principles. 
Consider a hypothetical case in which the defendant purposefully 
manufactures a product in her home state. Assume it is not her objective to 
sell her product in the forum, nor is she aware that such sales are practically 
certain to occur. In other words, she lacks either purpose or knowledge 
regarding purchase of her product by forum consumers. Assume also that 
she should be aware of a substantial likelihood of such purchases in the 
forum. In such a case, her mental state regarding the sale of her product in 
the forum is roughly equivalent to what the Model Penal Code calls 
negligence. Assume also that purpose is the required mental state for 
minimum contacts analysis. Does the defendant in this hypothetical have 
purpose? The Court can control the answer to this question by how it 
frames its analysis of mental state. If it chooses to make the defendant's 
conduct the focal point of the mental state analysis, then she has purpose. If 
it chooses to make the purchase of her product by forum consumers the 
focal point, she lacks purpose. 
D. Possible Remedies 
How might the Court improve its treatment of mental state? As pointed 
out above, the Court currently mentions a wide range of mental states in its 
minimum contacts cases. If it continues to employ an assortment of mental 
states, the Court must distinguish more clearly among them and be more 
consistent in its framing of the issue of mental state. In short, the Court 
needs to do to its treatment of mental state what the Model Penal Code did 
to the treatment of mens rea in criminal law. Use of an assortment of mental 
states could complement the proportionality requirement I suggest in Part 
IV. As in criminal law, the defendant's level of desert regarding the 
imposition of jurisdictional burdens would increase or decrease in 
proportion to the level of his mental state. 
Another way to clarify the Court's treatment of mental state would be 
to simplify it by abandoning inquiry into the defendant's subjective mental 
state in favor of a purely objective standard focusing on the degree of 
foreseeability. This second alternative strikes me as the more sensible path 
for reform for several reasons. The consequences of an imposition of 
jurisdiction are so much less drastic in severity and stigma than imposition 
of a criminal sanction that our intuitive sense of justice does not demand as 
searching an inquiry into subjective mental state as that found in many 
criminal cases. Making the test purely objective simplifies it and avoids the 
epistemological and practical proof objections raised by subjective 
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standards. 103 In the context of summary judgment, for example, the Court 
has recognized that objective mental states are more amenable than 
subjective mental states to pretrial resolution by a judge operating without a 
jury. 104 And despite the rhetorical emphasis on purpose in the Court's 
"purposeful availment" inquiries, its tendency has been to translate purpose 
into an objective standard. 105 An objective test based on foreseeability could 
be integrated into a proportionality requirement by correlating the level of 
burden to the degree of foreseeability. 
IV. PROPORTIONALITY 
If the expanding list of factors described in Part I above provides the 
criteria for the minimum contacts test, how does the Court assess the 
sufficiency of the facts in a particular case in meeting these criteria? In the 
language of International Shoe, how does the Court "mark the boundary 
line" between what justifies a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a 
defendant under the minimum contacts factors and what does not?106 In this 
part, I suggest that the Court answer this question by using a proportionality 
requirement similar to one found in criminal law. In short, the strength of 
the justification for imposing jurisdiction should be proportional to the 
degree of burden that jurisdiction actually imposes on the defendant. 
A. Fairness, Justice, and Reasonableness 
Although the Court has at times been expansive107 and at other times 
restrictive108 in marking this boundary line, it has regularly invoked three 
reference points. In International Shoe, the Court said that requiring the 
103. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Culpability and Other Minds, 2 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J. 41, 
63-88 (1993) (discussing the difficulties of assessing the mental state of others). 
104. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1981) ("There are special costs to 
'subjective' inquiries .... Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct ... should ... permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary 
judgment."). 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95. 
106. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ("It is evident that the 
criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection 
of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative."). 
107. Cf FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.11, at 127 ("The application of the minimum 
contacts, fair play and substantial justice standard allowed for considerable expansion of state 
jurisdictional power. A good example of the broad reach of the courts' power under the standard 
is McGee v. International Life Insurance Company."); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 695 
("In terms of general attitude toward the extent of jurisdiction, McGee represented the apogee of 
liberality by the Supreme Court."). 
108. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra 
note 4, § 3.11, at 127 ("If the McGee case suggested a newly unlimited jurisdictional reach for 
state courts, the Supreme Court was quick [in Hanson] to remind them that the territorial limits of 
Pennoyer still were relevant."). 
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defendant to defend must not offend " 'traditional notions of fa.IT play and 
substantial justice'" 109 and must be "reasonable." 110 These three reference 
points-fairness, justice, and reasonableness-recur throughout the 
Supreme Court's minimum contacts cases after International Shoe. 
Unfortunately, the abstract nature of standards such as fa.ITness, justice, 
and reasonableness gives their meanings a confusing plasticity. Fa.ITness, 
for example, is often used to refer to quite different, often contradictory 
notions. Some view fairness as concerned primarily with process. For 
example, a "farr" trial is one conducted according to prescribed rules. 111 
Others see fairness as concerned primarily with result. In this sense, a 
"fa.IT" trial is one with an accurate factual outcome. 112 For some, justice 
requires uniformity. Captured in the precept "treat like cases alike," 113 this 
view of justice measures treatment of an individual by reference to the 
treatment of others. A competing view of justice is that it requires 
individualization. Often expressed in the phrase "just deserts," it measures 
"just" treatment of an individual by reference to individual moral desert 
rather than by reference to the treatment of others. 114 And what is 
reasonable may vary dramatically depending on the perspective and criteria 
used in assessing reasonableness. In the context of self-defense, for 
example, reasonableness may vary according to the gender of the 
defendant. 115 In the context of assessing a reasonable attorney's fee, what is 
reasonable may depend on whether the criterion is the amount of work 
invested or the value of the work to the client.116 
In its minimum contacts cases, the Court has exploited rather than 
remedied the inherent vagueness of the terms fairness, justice, and 
reasonableness. It has never given them specific content, often using them 
109. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)). 
110. /d. at 317. 
111. See, e.g., McGregor v. Clawson, 506 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) ("When 
we speak of the term 'fair trial,' to be accurate we should mean a trial conducted within the 
framework of procedural and substantive rules prescribed by law .... "). 
112. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984) ("In giving meaning to 
[the right to counsel], we must take its purpose-to ensure a fair trial-as the guide .... This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable." (emphasis added)); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking 
Hannless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79, 86 (1988) (" [T]he Court has expressed a 
reductionist notion of what a 'fair trial' means, defining it merely as a trial designed to produce a 
reliable outcome." (emphasis added)). 
113. H.L.A. HART, THECONCEPTOFLAW 155 (1961). 
114. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, 
supra note 36, at 1338. 
. 115. See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (requiring a self-defense jury 
Instruction to be tailored to the defendant's gender). 
116. Compare Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(approving a $1,000,000 attorney fee based largely on value of services to client rather than hours 
worked by attorney), with Bushman v. State Bar, 522 P.2d 312 (Cal. 1974) (finding a $2800 fee 
unreasonable based on hours worked rather than value to client). 
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interchangeably and inconsistently. International Shoe, for example, 
indicates that the standards of "fair play and substantial justice" are ex post 
standards, used to measure whether the defendant's past "contacts" make it 
fair and just to assert jurisdiction. 117 But World-Wide Volkswagen treats 
"fair play and substantial justice" as ex ante standards, used to assess the 
prospective factors after minimum contacts have been established under the 
retrospective factors. 118 In Asahi, the Court referred to its assessment of the 
prospective factors as bearing on "the determination of the reasonableness 
of the exercise of jurisdiction," 119 the same inquiry that World-Wide 
Volkswagen refers to as the" fair play and substantial justice inquiry." 120 
In short, it is not clear which conceptions of fairness, justice, and 
reasonableness govern the minimum contacts test. Conflicting and poorly 
articulated views of fairness, justice, and reasonableness appear to compete 
for-expression in the Court's minimum contacts cases. 
B. Proportionality as a Means for Marking the Boundary 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, a central, elusive question in 
minimum contacts doctrine is how to determine the sufficiency of a 
defendant's contacts. What quantity or quality of contacts justifies a state's 
asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident? The Court has often stated that its 
method for drawing the "boundary line" between insufficient and sufficient 
contacts is not "simply mechanical or quantitative" 121 and has referred to 
fairness, justice, and reasonableness in measuring sufficiency. 122 Otherwise, 
the Court has provided little guidance on this question. I suggest that the 
Court explicitly recognize a principle of proportionality as the primary 
criterion for determining the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts. 
To understand and apply the proportionality requirement discussed in 
this section, it is necessary to focus precisely on just what it is that requires 
justification in minimum contacts analysis. Should the concern be with 
justifying the entire burden defending the suit places on a defendant? Or is 
the proper focus any marginal increase in burden that would result if the 
117. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945). 
118. See F'RIEDEN1HAL ET AL, supra note 4, § 3.10, at 122 n.9 ("The Supreme Court in 
[World- Wide Volkswagen] explicitly adopted the two-pronged approach, characterizing the 
minimum contacts inquiry as a threshold question. Only when minimum contacts are found to 
exist among the parties and the forum do fair play and substantial justice become relevant 
considerations." (emphasis added)). 
119. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
120. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations 
omitted). 
121. lntemational Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
122. See supra Section IV .A. 
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defendant defended the suit in the forum chosen by the plaintiff rather than 
at home? 
Justice Brennan implicitly adopted the latter focus on the marginal 
increase in burden in his dissent in World- Wide Volkswagen, finding the 
burden in that case slight because if the suit went. forward in the forum "the 
defendant would bear almost no burden or expense beyond what he would 
face if the suit were in his home State." 123 Since a state clearly can assert 
jurisdiction over its own citizens, the defendant's home state could impose 
on her the burden of defending at home, regardless of magnitude, without a 
constitutionally valid complaint from the defendant. Such a burden is 
simply a result of the plaintiff's choice to sue the defendant. In most cases, 
this burden inevitably will be borne by the defendant either at home or 
elsewhere. 
By contrast, any marginal increase in the burden of defending the suit 
due to the defendant's having to defend in a foreign forum results from the 
plaintiff's choice of forum rather than from her choice to sue. Since the 
plaintiff's choice of forum, rather than her choice to sue, is the primary 
concern of minimum contacts inquiry, the only burden that should count for 
minimum contacts purposes is the marginal increase attributable to that 
decision. Expenses for travel and local counsel and the application of less 
favorable and more costly procedural, evidentiary, or substantive rules are 
examples of things that might produce a marginal increase in the burden of 
defending. 
This marginal difference in burden will vary from case to case and is 
capable of ranging from nonexistent to severe. At the de minimis end of the 
burden spectrum, imagine a case in which the parties, citizens of different 
but adjoining states, live in cities in their respective states that are 
geographically quite close, such as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and 
Camden, New Jersey, or Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri. 
Assume that the relevant substantive, procedural, and evidentiary mles tha,t 
would be applied in both the forum and the home state are the same and 
that, because of the geographical proximity, the lawyer who would 
represent the defendant if sued in her home state can represent her in the 
fomm state in this particular lawsuit at the same cost as in her home state. 
In such a case, the forum's assertion of jurisdiction may impose no 
marginal increase in burden on the defendant. Litigating in the out-of-state 
fomm in such a case may in fact be less burdensome than if the defendant 
were sued in a distant part of her home state. 124 In short, the fomm' s 
123. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
124. See id. at 301 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In fact, a courtroom just across the state 
line from a defendant may often be far more convenient for the defendant than a courtroom in a 
distant comer of his own State."). 
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assertion of jurisdiction would result in no marginal increase in the cost to 
the defendant of defending the case. 
At the severe end of the burden spectrum, by contrast, consider a 
hypothetical case in which the forum state and the defendant's home state 
or country are far from one another, such as California and Japan, or 
Louisiana and Maine. Assume too that the forum would apply substantive, 
procedural, and evidentiary rules much less favorable and more costly to 
the defendant than those that would apply in her home state. Because of 
distance and the differences in applicable laws, the defendant needs to hire 
local counsel in addition to her regular home state lawyer. In short, 
litigating the case in such a forum would result in a significant marginal 
increase in the burden of defending the suit compared to defending at home. 
One could easily imagine other scenatios in which the magnitude of the 
burden falls somewhere between these two extremes. 
Both desert and utility are matters of degree as well. A defendant that 
routinely sells a large volume of its product in the forum has a higher level 
of desert regarding the bmden of responding to a lawsuit in the forum than 
one that occasionally sells a product there, and the occasional seller has a 
higher level of desert than a defendant that sold a product in the forum on a 
single occasion. Similarly, a defendant who acts with purpose regarding the 
forum has a higher level of desert than one who lacks such purpose and acts 
with a mental state akin to recklessness or negligence. And the utility of the 
forum's assertion of jurisdiction also can vary across a wide spectrum. In 
the most extreme cases, falling at either end of the utility spectrum, all of 
the minimum contacts prospective factors could weigh in favor of or 
against the utility of the forum's exercise of jurisdiction. In more typical 
cases, some utility factors could weigh in favor of and some against the 
utility of the forum's exercise of jurisdiction, with net utility falling 
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. 
In sum, burden, desert, and utility are continuous, not dichotomous. 
Unlike death, they exist in degrees that may vary greatly. The Court's 
current theoretical approach tends to be dichotomous: You simply have 
minimum contacts or you do not. Like a two-position on-off switch used to 
control the volume on a radio, such an approach is inappropriate for notions 
such as burden, desert, and utility in particular or for due process analysis 
generally. 125 By explicitly using a proportionality requirement, the Court 
would acknowledge and directly address the variable nature of each of 
these critical elements in minimum contacts analysis. 
In addition to acknowledging the continuous nature of these key 
ingredients, the Court should also establish some correspondence among 
125. Cf Redish, supra note 5, at 1138 ("[A] due process decision is generally a matter of 
degree."). 
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them-that is, the Court should require proportionality between the degree 
of burden imposed in a particular case and the degree of desert and utility 
present in the same case. Such a requirement would help answer the elusive 
sufficiency question in minimum contacts by providing an explicit criterion 
where one currently does not. exist. A defendant's minimum contacts would 
be sufficient if the degree of desert and utility revealed by the minimum 
contacts factors were roughly proportional to the degree of burden imposed. 
Concern with proportionality permeates many different areas of law, 
especially criminal law. One finds it in the constitutional requirement of 
proportional punishment derived from the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
of cruel and unusual punishments. 126 One also finds it in criminal statutes. 
The basic architecture of the law of homicide, for example, reveals a 
spectrum of offenses ranging from negligent homicide to murder, the 
severity of which varies in direct propmiion to the mens rea of the 
defendant. 127 
Proportionality in the context of minimum contacts jurisdiction has 
strong intuitive moral appeal, which may explain why individual Justices 
have at times expressed concern for proportionality in the context of 
minimum contacts. In his dissent in Hanson, Justice Black refers to a 
"disproportionate burden on a nonresident defendant" as offensive to 
International Shoe's "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice"' standard.128 But he never states the standard by which such 
disproportionality might be measured. And Justice Brennan, dissenting in 
World-Wide Volkswagen, states that "[b]ecause lesser burdens reduce the 
unfairness to the defendant, jurisdiction may be justified despite less 
significant contacts." 129 With this statement, Justice Brennan acknowledges 
the continuous nature of both burden and justification and suggests a 
correlation between them. 
In more recent cases, the Court has used a two-tiered scheme to 
measure the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts, reflecting a crude sort of 
126. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (stating that the Eighth Amendment's 
"final clause prohibits ... sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed"). 
127. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 (1980) (dividing homicide into murder, 
manslaughter, and negligent homicide based primarily on the defendant's culpability). 
128. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235; 259 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
The sentence from which the language in the text is taken reads as follows: 
It seems to me that where a transaction has as much relationship to a State as Mrs. 
Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts ought to have power to adjudicate 
controversies arising out of that transaction, unless litigation there would impose such a 
heavy and disproportionate burden on a nonresident defendant that it would offend 
what this Court has referred to as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice." 
!d. at 258-59 (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
129. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
226 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 189 
proportionality. 130 With a lesser level of contacts, jurisdiction can be 
exercised over the defendant for a case related to the contacts, called 
specific jurisdiction. With a higher level of contacts, jurisdiction can be 
asserted for cases unrelated to the contacts, called general jurisdiction.131 In 
short, the greater burden of responding to both related and unrelated cases 
is justified by a higher level of contacts; the lesser burden of responding 
only to related cases is justified by a lower level of contacts. 
But the concern with proportionality one may find latent in such 
passages remains in the shadows. And the specific-general jUiisdiction 
scheme simply replaces the two-position approach with three positions. It 
still falls short of responding to the many variations one may encounter in 
the degrees of burden, desert, and utility implicated in minimum contacts 
cases. 
V. A MIXED THEORY 
A. One Step or Two? 
The Supreme Court has been etTatic on the basic architecture of the 
minimum contacts test. Early cases such as International Shoe and McGee 
used a" very loose, unstructured approach," 132 sometimes called a" unified 
approach," 133 which does not treat retrospective and prospective factors 
separately. Starting in 1980, World- Wide Volkswagen and some later cases 
such as Burger King and Asahi adopted a "two step" 134 or "two-
pronged" 135 approach, dividing retrospective and prospective factors into 
distinct analytical components. Other cases after World- Wide Volkswagen, 
such as Calder and Keeton, returned to the original unstructured approach 
of International Shoe and McGee. As with the addition of factors, the cases 
that adopt the two-step approach neither acknowledge nor attempt to justify 
alteration of the test. 136 Consequently, there is now doubt about the structure 
of the minimum contacts test. More specifically, there is doubt about 
whether the minimum contacts test has just one "loose" step mixing 
130. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 
(1984). 
131. The specific and general jurisdiction classification scheme was originally suggested in 
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 
79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1135-63 (1966). 
132. LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WlliTIEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 290 (1994). 
133. See, e.g., F'RIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.10 at 122 n.9. 
134. TEPLY & WlliTIEN, supra note 132, at 290-91. 
135. F'RIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.10 at 122 n.9. 
136. See id. ("Many later decisions appear to sever the standard into a two-pronged test. 
These decisions neither explicitly admit that the test has been altered nor attempt to base the 
bifurcation upon the text of lntemational Shoe itself."). 
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retrospective and prospective factors or two steps treating retrospective and 
prospective factors separately. 
In addition to this ambiguity about whether the test has one step or two, 
the cases that use the two-step approach give mixed signals as to how the 
two components interact. World-Wide Volkswagen treats the retrospective 
component as a necessary condition, fulfillment of which is assessed 
independent of any inquiry into the prospective component. 137 Asahi treats 
the prospective component the same way-as a necessary condition the 
sufficiency of which is assessed independently of the retrospective 
component. 138 Burger King, though, suggests the two components are 
interdependent, stating at one point that prospective factors " sometimes 
serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing" 
of the retrospective factors. 139 In the next sentence, Burger King indicates 
that if under the retrospective component the defendant has purposefully 
directed his activities at forum residents, then the burden shifts to the 
defendant to make a compelling showing against jurisdiction under the 
prospective component.140 Thus, adoption of the two-step approach gives 
rise to other ambiguities. 
B. Integrating Desert and Utility 
An important issue raised by the desert/utility framework discussed in 
Section I is how to integrate desert and utility, with their distinct 
perspectives and criteria, into a single minimum contacts test. The 
retrospective justice and prospective · utility paradigms can work in 
harmony. A lengthy prison term for a highly culpable and dangerous 
defendant, for example, may be both deserved by the defendant and useful 
to society in preventing future crime through deterrence and incapacitation. 
Imposing damage liability on a negligent tortfeasor can both serve 
retrospective corrective justice by compensating a victim for past damages 
and simultaneously be socially useful in deterring other potential 
tortfeasors. Similarly, a state's imposition of jurisdiction on a foreign 
corporation may be done retrospectively just because the corporation 
deserves it, having purposefully marketed and sold a large quantity of its 
137. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) ("Because 
we find that petitioners have no 'contacts, ties, or relations' with the State of Oklahoma, the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma [upholding jurisdiction] is [r]eversed." (emphasis 
omitted) (citation omitted)). 
138. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) ("Considering 
the international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the 
plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi 
in this instance would be unreasonable and unfair."). 
139. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,477 (1985). 
140. See id. 
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products in the forum. Such an imposition of jurisdiction may be socially 
useful if the state is an efficient location in which to conduct the litigation. 
But as their viewpoints and criteria suggest, there is also significant 
potential for tension between the retrospective justice and prospective 
utility paradigms. Punishing an innocent person who appears guilty to the 
public could be useful in deterring future offenders but would offend 
retributive justice. 141 Rehabilitating or deterring chronic shoplifters might 
require lengthy incarceration out of proportion to the culpability of 
shoplifting. 142 Vicarious liability in tort may be socially useful in terms of 
deterrence 143 but contrary to retrospective justice, since it imposes the 
burdens of liability without proof of past culpability. 144 A forum state to 
which a divorced, custodial parent and her children have moved and in 
which they have resided for years may, from society's perspective, be a 
useful place to litigate a child support matter brought by the custodial 
parent. But imposition by the forum of jurisdiction on the noncustodial 
parent may be retrospectively unjust if undeserved by the defendant. 145 As 
these cases suggest, the purposes associated with the minimum contacts test 
may pull in opposite directions. Concern with individual justice, for 
example, would not dictate efficiency as a factor; neither utility nor 
federalism would be concerned with the defendant's past mental state. In 
part, it is the divergent nature of these purposes and their respective focal 
points that lends current doctrine an internally inconsistent, contradictory 
quality. 
One of the advantages of articulating desert and utility as the focal 
points of the minimum contacts test is that it forces us to confront this 
tension. Paul Robinson has written about the need for developing mixed 
theories in criminal law to deal with just such tensions. The retrospective 
and prospective purposes of the criminal law-just punishment, deterrence, 
141. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 41. at 238-42 (discussing the notion of "scapegoating" 
from both utilitarian and desert perspectives). 
142. Cf Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 
MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1173 (1974) (arguing that punishment in excess of desert is equivalent to 
punishing the innocent, even if it serves other purposes); Andrew von Hirsch & Lisa Maher, 
Should Penal Rehabilitationism Be Revived?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1992, at 25, 27-
28 (discussing the tension between rehabi1itationism and desert). 
143. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious 
Liability, 69 S. CALL. REv. 1739 (1996). 
144. Similarly, strict liability may also be socially useful but contrary to retrospective justice. 
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 75, at 534 (5th ed. 
1984): 
I d. 
"Strict liability," ... as that term is commonly used by modem courts, means liability 
that is imposed on an actor apart from either (I) an intent to interfere with a legally 
protected interest without a legal justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of duty to 
exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence. This is often referred to as liability 
without fault. 
145. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100-01 (1978). 
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incapacitation, and rehabilitation-frequently conflict because, Robinson 
writes, "each purpose requires consideration of different criteria." 146 When 
such conflicts occur, 
[u]ltimately a choice must be made to follow one purpose at the 
expense of another. Yet, when faced with conflicting purposes, 
judges, legislators, and sentencing-guideline drafters have no 
principle to guide that decision. In the absence of a guiding 
principle, the choices made are at best inconsistent. ... At worst, 
the absence of a guiding principle fosters arbitrariness or 
prejudice. 147 
The same can be said about the conflicts between desert and utility in 
minimum contacts cases. The minimum contacts doctrine fails even to 
acknowledge-much less provide guidance in resolving-such conflicts. 
The result, as Robinson suggests, is the sort of inconsistency and 
arbitrariness that has plagued the Supreme Court's minimum contacts cases 
for over five decades. 
How should we deal with this tension? In the theoretical debate over 
the underlying purposes of tort law, advocates of prospective utility or 
retrospective justice have tended to disparage or ignore the opposing 
viewpoint. 148 Similarly, in the minimum contacts debate, some scholars 
have argued that the Court should adopt either an exclusively prospective or 
exclusively retrospective viewpoint. 149 Another way to handle the tension 
between social utility and individual justice can be found in the work of 
scholars in criminal law150 and more recently in tort law151 who advance 
mixed theories that express concern for both prospective utility and 
retrospective justice. Given the Court's tendency to use both retrospective 
and prospective components in its minimum contacts doctrine, such mixed 
theories may provide useful models for accommodating the tension 
between these two components. Explicitly adopting such a theory would 
also help clarify the ambiguity about the test's current architecture. 
146. Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 19, 19-20 (1987). 
147. ld. at 20. 
148. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1806 (1997) (describing "the extent to which each 
school commonly downplays or disparages the other"). 
149. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 5, at 1137-42; Stravitz, supra note 5, at 811-12. 
150. Criminal scholars who have written on mixed theories of criminal law include H.L.A. 
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8-13 (1968); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND TIIE 
CRIMINAL LAW 179-209 (1982); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 6-19 (1993); 
Greenawalt, supra note 114, at 1342-43; and Robinson, supra note 146. 
151. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 148 (attempting to develop a mixed theory of tort law). 
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C. Justifying With Utility, Limiting With Desert 
What form should a mixed theory of minimum contacts take? In my 
view, the form of mixed theory that seems most promising is modeled on a 
form of mixed theory, popular among criminal law theorists, that uses 
utility as a justifying principle152 and desert as a limiting principle.153 As 
described by Michael Moore, this form of mixed theory 
asserts that we do not punish people because they deserve it. Desert 
enters in, this theory further asserts, only as a limit on punishment: 
We punish offenders because some net social gain is achieved, 
such as the prevention of crime, but only if such offenders deserve 
it. It is, in other words, the achieving of a net social gain that 
justifies punishment, whereas the desert of offenders serves as a 
limiting condition on punishment but as no part of its 
justification. 154 
A m1mmum contacts mixed theory based on this model would have 
multiple steps, each explicitly tied to an underlying purpose of the 
minimum contacts test. There would be either two or three steps, depending 
on whether the Court ultimately retains or jettisons federalism as one of the 
test's purposes. 155 
If federalism is retained as a purpose of the test, the Court would 
require as a first step that the prospective utility calculation regarding the 
forum's assertion of jurisdiction be broad enough to include and give 
appropriate weight to factors other than the interests of the forum and its 
citizens (such as efficiency from an interstate perspective). In other words, 
in pursuing its utility inquiry, the Court would require the forum to include 
and give adequate weight to the various prospective factors that call on the 
forum to look beyond its own parochial interests. This step would give 
expression to the purpose of federalism. 
As a second step, the Court would determine whether the forum's 
exercise of jUiisdiction would produce adequate utility. While the forum 
need not be the optimal place for resolving the case from a utilitarian 
perspective, the Court could nonetheless require either (1) some net gain in 
utility compared with possible alternative fora; or (2) sufficient 
proportionality between the net utility resulting from the forum's exercise 
of jurisdiction and the degree of marginal burden imposed on the defendant. 
152. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 146, at 29-31 (discussing determining and limiting 
principles in mixed theories of criminal law). 
153. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 10-11 (1997) (discussing 
retribution as a limiting principle in criminal law). 
154. MOORE, supra note 41, at 237 (footnote omitted). 
155. See supra Section II.B. 
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This step would give expression to the purpose of advancing prospective 
utility. 
As a third step, the Court would express the purpose of protecting the 
individual defendant by drawing on the notion of desert. It would require 
the Court to reject an imposition of jurisdiction, regardless of its utility, if 
such an imposition would be grossly disproportionate to the defendant's 
desert as determined by the test's retrospective factors. 
In summary, the Court would ask and answer the following questions: 
1. Is the utility inquiry sufficiently broad to satisfy federalism? 
2. Is the forum's exercise of jurisdiction sufficiently useful? 
3. Is the forum's exercise of jurisdiction grossly unjust to the individual 
defendant from a desert perspective? 
This form of mixed theory has several things to recommend it. It gives 
explicit expression to each of the purposes identified in Part ll. It can easily 
be modified if, as suggested in Burger King, the Court ultimately decides to 
reject federalism as an animating purpose by deleting step one and turning 
the test into two steps. 156 Also, it is consistent with the historical trend in the 
Court's minimum contacts cases from International Shoe to Asahi toward 
giving weight to both desert and utility and with the recent prominence of 
utility, which was expressed with particular emphasis in Asahi. 
Recognizing utility as the primary determining principle and desert as a 
limiting principle in minimum contacts doctrine is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's larger due process jurisprudence outside the context of 
minimum contacts. Laurence Tribe describes the Supreme Court's due 
process jurisprudence as reflecting two "alternative conceptions of the 
primary purpose of procedural due process," which he labels "intrinsic" 
and "instrumental." 157 These "competing visions" 158 are analogous in 
broad philosophical perspective to the competing retrospective justice and 
prospective utility paradigms in minimum contacts analysis. The intrinsic 
conception grounds due process rights in the dignity of the person seeking 
the due process right. 159 This intrinsic conception of due process could be 
restated as expressing the view that individuals deserve due process rights 
on grounds of personal dignity. What Tribe terms the instrumental 
conception, by contrast, " views the requirements of due process as 
156. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.13 (1985). 
157. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 10-7, at 666. 
158. !d. 
159. See id. ("One approach begins with the proposition that there is intrinsic value in the 
due process right to be heard, since it grants to the individuals or groups against whom 
government decisions operate the chance to participate in the process by which those decisions are 
made, an opportunity that expresses their dignity as persons."). -
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constitutionally identified and valued less for their intrinsic character than 
for their anticipated consequences as a means for assuring that the society's 
agreed-upon rules ... are in fact accurately and consistently followed." 160 
Again, this instrumental conception could be restated as one valuing due 
process rights for the prospective utility of accurately enforcing legal rules. 
The instrumental view clearly has dominated the Supreme Court's due 
process jurisprudence, with the intrinsic view receiving occasional 
acknowledgrnent. 161 Making the instrumental conception of utility in 
minimum contacts a justifying principle and the intrinsic conception of 
desert a secondary limiting principle is therefore consistent with the 
Supreme Court's general preference for instrumental over intrinsic 
approaches to due process. 
Finally, casting desert as a limiting rather than a justifying principle in 
minimum contacts analysis seems to fit well with the essentially negative 
way both desert and due process claims are raised in the context of 
minimum contacts. The classic "just deserts" approach in criminal law 
views the need for punishment of deserving defendants as the "ethical 
imperative" 162 that drives criminal law. On this view, all blameworthy 
defendants should be punished simply because they deserve it, regardless of 
the prospective utility of punishment. 163 Casting desert as a similar ethical 
imperative makes no sense in the minimum contacts context. We feel no 
moral imperative to subject all nonresidents who satisfy the minimum 
contacts retrospective factors to jurisdiction by the forum just because they 
deserve it. We do not demand, for example, subjection to forum jurisdiction 
for every nonresident who purposefully sells a large volume of products in 
the forum, as a retributivist would demand punishment for every purposeful 
killer simply because he deserves it. 
Many criminal law theorists, however, accept desert as a limiting 
principle on the application of consequentialist views of punishment. 164 On 
this view, criminals should be punished if it is socially useful, but only if 
160. ld. § 10-7, at 666-67 (emphases added). 
161. See id. § 10-7, at671. 
The Court, while nonetheless pursuing an almost exclusively instrumental vision in its 
due process jurisprudence, has at times acknowledged, that procedural due process is of 
intrinsic significance, alluding to considerations weighing in favor of giving an 
individual procedural protections well beyond those that might be justified solely by the 
need to make an accurate determination. 
ld.; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 13.8, at 524 
(4th ed. 1991) ("The Supreme Court has tended to view its decisions on necessary procedures 
under the due process clause in an essentially utilitarian fashion." (emphasis added)). 
162. BONNIE ET AL., supra note 153, at 10. 
163. See MOORE, supra note 41, at 236 ("A retributivist theory is necessarily nonutilitarian 
in character, for it eschews justifying punishment by its tendency to achieve any form of net social 
gain. Rather, retributivism asserts that punishment is properly inflicted because, and only because, 
the person deserves it."). 
164. See id.; see also PACKER, supra note 46, at 67-70. 
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they deserve punishment and only if the punishment is proportional to their 
desert. The crime of shoplifting, a relatively minor crime from a dese1i 
perspective, might be rampant in a particular jurisdiction. Punishing with 
severe prison terms both innocent persons strongly suspected of shoplifting 
and persons actually guilty of shoplifting might send a powerful general 
deterrent message. But even a jurisdiction that accepted deterrence as the 
determining principle for punishment would refrain from punishing in this 
way if it accepted desert as a limiting principle. 
Desert as just such a limiting principle makes sense in the minimum 
contacts context. Civil defendants generally are dragged into court 
primarily for the utilitarian reason of aiding in the resolution of a lawsuit to 
enforce the substantive law. But we think it just to ask them to submit to 
this utilitarian demand only if they can be said to deserve that imposition. 
Recognizing desert as a limiting principle allows it to act as a shield 
against society's tendency to use individuals merely as means to collective 
social goals. This shielding quality fits well with the way due process 
claims are raised in the minimum contacts context. When a defendant 
complains in a minimum contacts case about being forced to participate in a 
forum's litigation process, describing her complaint as a claim for due 
process is a bit awkward. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he 
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be 
heard." 165 A defendant making a due process claim typically seeks 
participation in the process for resolving a dispute, most often through a 
hearing from a government refusing her such participation. In Fuentes v. 
Shevin, for example, Mrs. Fuentes wanted the chance to participate in a 
hearing about the seizure of her stove and stereo. 166 The elderly patients in 
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center161 wanted to participate in a 
hearing about their nursing home being decertified as eligible to receive 
Medicare/Medicaid payments. The lawyers in Leis v. Flynt wanted to 
participate in a hearing about their pro hac vice admission to Ohio's 
courts. 168 
In a minimum contacts case, by contrast, the defendant is making the 
reverse of the typical due process claim. Rather than seeking to participate 
in a state's legal process, she wants to be shielded from coerced 
participation. This idea of due process as a shield from coerced 
participation is captured in Hanson's language about a due process 
165. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 
(1972), the Court similarly emphasized that "[f]or more than a century the central meaning of 
procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be 
heard .... "' 
166. 407 U.S. at 71. 
167. 447 U.S. 773 (1980). 
168. 439 u.s. 438 (1979). 
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"guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation" 169 and 
World-Wide Volkswagen's description of one of the minimum contacts 
test's functions as protecting " the defendant against the burdens of 
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum." 170 It might be more accurate, 
then, to describe such a defendant's claim as one for protectionj7·om undue 
process rather than a claim for due process. Expressing desert as a limiting 
principle is consistent with this attitude toward due process as a shield 
against injustice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
On Saturday afternoons, my local public radio station airs a cooking 
show featuring a game called" Stump the Cook." A listener calls in with a 
list of items occupying space in his refrigerator and challenges the show's 
host to create something edible and appetizing from the random ingredients. 
The minimum contacts test poses a similar challenge: How does one take 
the motley assortment of ingredients strewn throughout the Court's 
minimum contacts cases and tum them into a coherent, sensible theory of 
personal jurisdiction for nonresident defendants? 
Discarding what one finds in existing minimum contacts doctrine and 
starting fresh may be an easier and more promising route to a satisfying 
theory of personal jurisdiction. As noted earlier, however, the Supreme 
Court has shown little inclination to discard and a strong inclination to 
keep, use, and add to the ingredients currently found in minimum contacts 
analysis. Given that attitude, the central challenge is how to make better use 
of what is cmTently there. A mixed theoty of personal jurisdiction such as 
the one advanced in this Essay, blending notions of desert, utility, and 
proportionality, would do just that. It would make use of all the current 
minimum contacts factors, allow for new additions to both the desert and 
utility components, and blend them in a way that is both just and workable. 
Such a theory will not cure all the ambiguities found in the minimum 
contacts doctrine. Desert and proportionality are difficult to assess, and 
each is subject to measurement by differing and often conflicting standards. 
Desert, for example, may be gauged by internal fault or resulting harm. 
Calculations of utility are similarly freighted with weighing and common 
metric problems. But as with all legal rules, the standard of acceptability for 
a theory of personal jurisdiction should not be perfection, but whether the 
theory improves on the current state of doctrine. And, in comparison with 
169. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958). 
170. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
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the current state of the minimum contacts test, a mixed theory such as that 
suggested in this Essay would represent a significant increase in both 
coherence and rationality. 
